





























The JENA ECONOMIC RESEARCH PAPERS is a joint publication of the Friedrich 
Schiller University and the Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena, Germany. 




Friedrich Schiller University Jena  Max Planck Institute of Economics 
Carl-Zeiss-Str. 3  Kahlaische Str. 10 
D-07743 Jena  D-07745 Jena 
www.uni-jena.de   www.econ.mpg.de 
 
© by the author.  
 










Imperial College Business School 
 
Zoltan Acs 




The purpose of this paper is to examine the existence of cross-level moderating 
effects between national appropriability conditions, individual level predictors and 
entrepreneurial growth aspirations.  We test a multi-level model that connects the 
determinants of strategic resource allocation decisions at the individual level with 
the strength of the intellectual property rights regime at the national level.   The 
results suggest that the strengths of the intellectual property regime will moderate 
negatively the relationship between an individual's education and her growth 
aspirations and moderate positively the relationship between an individual’s 
income and her growth aspirations. The findings support claims that strategic 
entrepreneurial behavior cannot be fully understood without giving attention to the 
context in which those behaviors are observed 
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INTRODUCTION 
One of the pertinent questions in the emerging agenda of strategic entrepreneurship research concerns 
the susceptibility of strategic entrepreneurial behaviours to institutional and cultural influences 
(Schendel et al., 2007:3). The protection of intellectual property rights constitutes a particularly 
important influence, because it directly influences the leakage of opportunities through imitation, and 
thus, the efficiency with which the creation of competitive advantage can be combined with the pursuit 
of opportunity (Hitt et al., 2001; Schendel et al., 2007). As Schendel and Hitt (2007:4) observed, 
nations differ in terms of their regimes of intellectual property protection, and therefore, the sharing of 
profits amongst innovators, developers, users, and consumers. The protection of intellectual property, 
therefore, is likely to have a direct influence on the allocation of effort into strategic entrepreneurship. 
In this paper, our objective is to advance the understanding of how the protection of intellectual 
property influences the allocation of effort into strategic entrepreneurship by individuals. 
Strategic entrepreneurship research addresses the intersection between strategic management 
and entrepreneurship in an effort to advance the understanding of how the creation of competitive 
advantage can be combined with the pursuit of opportunity (Ireland et al., 2003). Where strategic 
management research has been primarily concerned with the creation and exploitation of competitive 
advantage, entrepreneurship research has focused on the individual-opportunity nexus to understand 
how, by whom and with what consequences opportunities for entrepreneurial action are recognized and 
exploited (Shane et al., 2000). In this research we focus on strategic entrepreneurial actions of 
individuals and consider the decision to allocate one’s human and financial capital to the pursuit of 
growth through an entrepreneurial venture in lieu of alternative occupational pursuits. In the great 
majority of new ventures, the founder’s human and social capital constitute the most valuable, rare, and 
difficult-to-imitate aspect of the venture’s initial resource endowment, and therefore, the defining 
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invest her human, financial, and social capital into a new venture typically precludes the pursuit of 
alternative occupations, and the opportunity cost of this decision for the individual grows higher as a 
function of the value of her human, financial, and social capital (Cassar, 2006). Particularly for high-
human capital individuals, therefore, the decision to pursue growth opportunities through an 
entrepreneurial venture is a highly strategic decision in its own right, and also one that merges 
opportunity pursuit with the creation of initial competitive advantage in the venture. 
To understand the influence of intellectual property protection on an individual’s decision to 
allocate her human, social, and financial capital into the pursuit of growth through an entrepreneurial 
venture, we build a multi-level theory that connects resource allocation decisions at the individual level 
with the strength of the intellectual property rights regime at the national level. At the individual level, 
we treat the decision to allocate one’s human, social, and financial capital into a new venture as a 
rational decision made by individuals who seek to maximize the utility achievable with these resources. 
Although we acknowledge that decisions to pursue entrepreneurial ventures are also influenced by 
many non-rational aspects, such as cognitive biases, personal preferences, and social and cultural 
norms, the centrality of trade-offs associated with resource allocation decisions compels us to 
emphasize the rational aspects of this decision. These trade-offs are influenced by institutional 
conditions, specifically, the intellectual property protection regime (Foss et al., 2008). The strength of 
the IPR regime influences the appropriability of returns accruing to individual human capital, and more 
broadly, the functioning of markets for technology (Arora et al., 2001; Teece, 1998). We argue that the 
IPR protection regime will have a differential effect on how a given individual’s education and 
household income influence her pursuit of growth through an entrepreneurial venture. This is because 
of the way this technical appropriability impacts trade-offs associated with the allocation of human and 
financial capital by individuals. 
Jena Economic Research Papers 2009 - 080We test our model using data from the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) survey 
(Reynolds et al., 2005). Consisting of interviews with over 900 000 individuals in 54 countries over a 
period of 10 years, this data resource is uniquely suited for the study of the influence of institutional 
conditions on individual-level strategic entrepreneurial behaviors. We combine individual-level data 
from the GEM dataset with country-level data from Heritage Foundation and the International 
Monetary Fund to analyse cross-level interaction effects on individuals’ entrepreneurial growth 
aspirations. So doing, we seek several distinctive contributions to the nascent literature on strategic 
entrepreneurship. First, we respond to the call by editors of the Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal to 
examine effects of institutional conditions, IPR protection regime in particular, on strategic 
entrepreneurship. Second, we respond to several recent calls by various authors to develop and test 
multi-level theories and theoretical models in entrepreneurship and strategic management research 
(Busenitz et al., 2003; Davidsson et al., 2001; Hitt et al., 2007). This is the first study to examine 
country-level moderating effects on individual-level entrepreneurial growth aspirations. By adopting a 
multi-level approach, our analysis contributes toward a more generally applicable theory of strategic 
entrepreneurship than what is possible using single-country data, where variation in institutional 
conditions is typically zero. Third, by looking at growth aspirations of nascent and early-stage 
entrepreneurs, we move beyond post-hoc designs typically used in studies of entrepreneurial growth 
and shed light on growth aspirations and motivations that ultimately drive strategic entrepreneurship. 
Studying entrepreneurial growth decisions as they unfold eliminates the survival bias that afflicts post-
hoc designs. Fourth, specific to our framework, we examine the impact of intellectual property 
protection on entrepreneurial growth aspirations. In addition to constituting a central determinant of 
how profits on innovation are shared between innovators, producers, and users (Schendel et al., 2007), 
IPR protection falls within the remit of national governments, and a better understanding of how they 
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when it comes to fostering strategic entrepreneurship. 
The next section of this paper discusses the contextual influences on entrepreneurial growth 
aspirations, as well as the cross-level moderating effect of the national intellectual property protection 
regime on such aspirations. We develop hypotheses regarding the effect of an individual’s education 
and household income on her entrepreneurial growth aspirations.  Next we focus on the cross-level 
moderating effect of national intellectual property protection regime on these relationships. Section 
three discusses the variables and methods, and section four presents our findings. The findings show 
that institutional conditions moderate the extent to which individuals aspire to exploit their human and 
financial capital through entrepreneurial ventures. The strength of a country’s IPR protection regime 
moderates negatively the relationship between an individual’s education and her entrepreneurial growth 
aspirations, and it moderates positively the relationship between an individual’s household income and 
her entrepreneurial growth aspirations. This, we argue, is because of how IPR protection regulates the 
exploitation of innovator’s own human intellectual capital versus that of others. The conclusions are in 
the final section. 
 
STRATEGIC ENTREPRENEURIAL BEHAVIORS IN A MULTI-LEVEL APPROACH 
Entrepreneurship is customarily described as opportunity-seeking behavior that operates at multiple 
levels (Davidsson et al., 2001; Lumpkin et al., 1996; Stevenson et al., 1985). As such, this behavior is 
firmly embedded in a given social and economic context, within which some individuals stumble upon 
and discover opportunities through their interactions with others (Aldrich, 1999; Kirzner, 1997; 
Sorensen, 2007a). However, not all individuals take the decision to harness their own and others’ 
human capital for the pursuit of opportunities thus discovered. The decision to pursue entrepreneurial 
growth typically involves significant trade-offs, prompting careful weighting of the potential value of 
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pursuits (Cassar, 2006). Because such trade-offs are influenced by situational contingencies, it is: 
“…improbable that entrepreneurship can be explained solely by reference to a characteristic of certain 
people independent of the situations in which they find themselves” (Shane et al., 2000: 218). 
Therefore, to understand why some individuals and not others choose to pursue entrepreneurial growth, 
it is important to develop and test multi-level theories that consider not only individual-level 
characteristics, but also, the context within which those characteristics influence entrepreneurial 
behaviors (Busenitz et al., 2003; Davidsson et al., 2001; Phan, 2004).  
Although the multi-level character of entrepreneurial behaviors is widely recognized, most 
theories describing entrepreneurship focus on a single level of analysis. Some theories focus on the 
allocation of effort into entrepreneurial activities within the economy (Baumol, 1993; Baumol, 1996; 
Kirzner, 1973; Levie et al., 2008; Murphy et al., 1991a; Schumpeter, 1996), others emphasize the 
importance of social and institutional influences on entrepreneurial behaviors while downplaying the 
role of the individual (Aldrich et al., 1994; Sorensen, 2007b), and yet others have focused on 
individual-level behaviors (Gartner, 1988; McMullen et al., 2006; Sarason et al., 2006; Shane, 2000). 
To our knowledge, none of the received theories on entrepreneurship mix levels of analysis. In order to 
analyze institutional influences on individual-level strategic entrepreneurial behaviors, it is necessary to 
combine explanations from two levels of analysis into a coherent framework. This multi-level approach 
presents distinctive challenges for theory development (Kozlowski et al., 2000). First, theories focusing 
on different levels tend to emphasize different constructs and different causal mechanisms, thereby 
making it challenging to create meaningful, causality-preserving connectivity across levels of theory 
building. For example, the most salient individual-level theories of entrepreneurship have tended to 
emphasize psychological, cognitive, and social desirability influences on individual-level 
entrepreneurial behaviors, whereas most system-level theories have focused on issues such as culture, 
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used at one level do not always translate easily into causal mechanisms at another level. Second, in 
multi-level theory, directionality across levels matters. Usually, multi-level theories focus on 
aggregation processes that compose or compile micro-level processes into macro-level phenomena, but 
a reverse directionality is also possible, with higher-level conditions influencing micro-level processes, 
as is the case in our theoretical model. Third, specific to our research design, observed individual-level 
effects can be caused by both selection and behavioral processes – i.e., whether contextual factors 
guide the selection of high-potential individuals to entrepreneurship, or whether those conditions 
condition the behaviors of individuals who already have selected the entrepreneurial option. 
Distinguishing between the two is a challenge for both theory building and theory testing. 
The above considerations prompted the following choices in our theory building. First, we build 
a ‘top-down’ model in which higher-level conditions influence individual-level decision processes. In 
our model, thus, the emphasis is on theoretical disaggregation rather than aggregation, and the 
directionality in our model operates from context to individual decisions. Second, the causal link in our 
theoretical model operates through the influence of institutional conditions on personal resource 
allocation trade-offs faced by individuals. Consistent with previous considerations, we consider the 
main effect of intellectual property protection to operate through the distribution of profits between 
various stakeholders in innovative processes (Schendel et al., 2007). While we recognize that the 
decision to enter entrepreneurship is influenced by numerous factors, both rational and less rational (in 
terms of considerations related to the maximization of economic utility), the focus on the distribution of 
economic utility implies an emphasis on the rational aspects of individual decision processes. An 
emphasis on the rational aspects of individual strategic choices is consistent with, for example, the 
employment choice literature (Lazear, 2004). Third, as our national-level causal mechanism, we 
consider the effect of the intellectual property protection regime on markets for technology. This 
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build a model that incorporates both selection and behavioral arguments, and we control for the 
selection effect in our empirical analysis. 
In the following, we build a theoretical model on resource allocation commitments made by 
individuals facing opportunity costs in national markets for know-how (Arora et al., 2001; Teece, 
1998). 
 
INSTITUTIONAL INFLUENCES ON ENTREPRENEURIAL GROWTH ASPIRATIONS 
The pursuit of growth through an entrepreneurial venture is a fundamental aspect of strategic 
entrepreneurial behaviours (Davidsson et al., 2002; Ireland et al., 2003; Lumpkin et al., 1996) and a 
necessary precondition of entrepreneurial firm growth: even though mere aspiration will not guarantee 
firm growth, it is rare for firms to grow in the absence of growth aspiration (Delmar et al., 2008). 
While an extensive literature exists that has sought to explain entrepreneurial occupational choice 
(Blanchflower et al., 1998; Dunn et al., 2000; Evans et al., 1989; Hellmann, 2007a; Lazear, 2005), 
much less has been said about the choice to aspire for growth, once entry decision has been made 
(Cassar, 2006; Davidsson, 1989; Wiklund et al., 2003a; Wiklund et al., 2003b). Entrepreneurial entry 
and growth aspiration can be modeled as individual-level decisions through which individuals seek to 
take advantage of their human capital to pursue economic opportunities (Baumol, 1996; Shane et al., 
2000). When seeking to exploit their human capital to advance valued goals, entrepreneurs face 
important economic trade-offs (Åstbro et al., 2005; Bosma et al., 2004b; Bruderl et al., 1992; Kim et 
al., 2006; Uusitalo, 2001). First, potential entrepreneurs need to decide whether an entrepreneurial 
venture provides a better conduit than regular employment for the realization of valued goals. Second, 
entrepreneurs need to decide how much effort and resources (in the form of human capital) they should 
invest into growing their venture. Such trade-offs are not easy to strike, as human capital invested into 
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use, such as the search of a beneficial employment relationship (Sparrowe et al., 2001). Furthermore, 
because human capital investments tend to be path dependent (people develop specialized skills in their 
current occupation), career transitions become increasingly difficult over time. Therefore, the decision 
to start a high-growth venture is seldom taken without a careful consideration of related trade-offs. 
Macroeconomic conditions are likely to weigh on individual-level considerations related to 
human capital exploitation. A particularly important influence on entrepreneurial growth decisions has 
to do with technical appropriability conditions – the intellectual property rights (IPR) protection regime 
– and how it impacts the ability of inventors and investors to protect their human and intellectual 
capital and exploit that of others (Feldman et al., 2002). We argue that technical appropriability 
conditions will differentially influence the alternatives available to high-income and well-educated 
individuals, respectively. Our theoretical model is illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
*** figure 1 around here *** 
 
  In the following, we first lay out the direct hypotheses concerning the effect of education and 
household income on entrepreneurial growth aspirations. We then focus on the main aspect of our 
study, i.e., the moderating effect of national appropriability conditions on these relationships. 
  
Education, Household Income, and Growth Aspirations 
Consistent with received literature, we argue that an individual’s education will have a positive effect 
on her entrepreneurial growth aspirations. We propose two causes for this positive association. First, 
education enhances entrepreneurs’ skills, cognitive capacity and social capital, thereby enhancing her 
growth self-efficacy. Second, education represents a valuable human capital asset in its own right, and 
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ante, prompt well-educated individuals to select higher-quality opportunities, and, ex post, drive the 
entrepreneur to seek faster growth through the venture so as to cover associated opportunity costs. 
For nascent and new ventures, the entrepreneur’s human capital, as expressed in her education, 
experience, and skills, constitutes arguably the single most important initial resource endowment 
(Shrader et al., 2007; Wright et al., 2007). Education represents a key aspect of entrepreneurs’ human 
capital (Bosma et al., 2004a; Cooper et al., 1994; Ucbasaran et al., 2008): it enhances cognitive ability, 
thereby enabling individuals to better recognize opportunities, as well as to manage to complexities 
involved with the start-up process (Shane et al., 2000). Through the process of obtaining formal 
education, individuals may also acquire valuable social capital and contacts that can be leveraged to 
mobilize resources for the pursuit of entrepreneurial opportunities (Gerber et al., 2008; Stevens et al., 
2008). The skills and competencies developed through formal education also serve to enhance the 
entrepreneur’s legitimacy, enabling her to mobilize the resources necessary to fuel entrepreneurial firm 
growth and enhance its sustainability (Bruderl et al., 1992; Honig, 2004; Ucbasaran et al., 2008). These 
mechanisms enhance educated individuals’ ability to grow their ventures, as well as her self-efficacy in 
doing so. This translates into faster growth expectations. 
Education also increases opportunity costs associated with alternative occupational pursuits 
(Murphy et al., 1991b). Building up human capital through education represents a major investment of 
time and money, one expected to produce subsequent returns in the form of high-quality employment 
and increased renumeration (Dominitz et al., 1996; Kane et al., 1995). Because individuals typically 
can pursue only one career path at any given time, the opportunity costs associated with the allocation 
of individual-level human capital to alternative uses are not taken lightly (Cassar, 2007). In order for 
individuals with a high education to choose entrepreneurship over employment, therefore, the expected 
returns to this alternative have to be commensurate with the opportunity costs involved, making highly 
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educated individual has chosen the entrepreneurial option, the same opportunity costs would drive her 
to seek faster growth in an effort to recoup returns that are commensurate with the opportunity costs 
involved. Both of these mechanisms should translate into a positive relationship between education and 
expected growth in the new venture.  
Consistent with the above arguments, Davidsson and Honig found a positive association between 
formal education and opportunity identification (Davidsson et al., 2003), and Bates (1990) found that 
highly educated individuals were more likely to start new firms. There is also increasing evidence to 
support the importance of education for entrepreneurial growth aspirations at both individual and 
national levels (Autio, 2007; Levie et al., 2008). Summarizing, we hypothesize: 
H1  An individual’s level of education will be associated positively with her aspiration to 
grow her venture. 
 
Financial income provides another important precursor of entrepreneurial growth aspirations. 
Two mechanisms are relevant for our argument in this paper. First, household income has a positive 
influence on income expectations (e.g., Smith et al., 1990). Similarly to highly educated individuals, 
individuals from high-income households would place greater ex ante demands for the quality of 
entrepreneurial opportunities when choosing between alternative occupational pursuits. High-income 
households would likely provide a fertile environment for accessing high-quality opportunities, because 
the social connectivity associated with financial wealth would enable individuals from high-income 
households to see more entrepreneurial growth opportunities (Dunn et al., 2000). Second, high-income 
households are better endowed with financial resources. Alongside with human capital, entrepreneurs 
require financial resources to pursue entrepreneurial opportunities. While the most promising new 
ventures can tap venture capital to access resources, this option is usually only available for the most 
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combined with those obtained from family and friends, constitute by far the most important source of 
financial resources for new and aspiring ventures (Minniti et al., 2006).  Financial capital inputs enable 
the entrepreneur to acquire other resources necessary to pursue entrepreneurial growth, such as human 
and intellectual capital. Greater ability to acquire resources from resource markets should translate into 
faster growth expectations. Summarizing, we predict: 
H2  An individual’s household income will be associated positively with her aspiration to 
grow her venture.  
 
Intellectual Property Protection, Education, and Growth Aspiration 
We propose that the strength of a country’s intellectual property protection regime will have a different 
moderating influence on how a given individual’s education and household income, respectively, 
influence her entrepreneurial growth aspirations. This is primarily because of the way well-functioning 
markets for technology influence the choices available for individuals who are making strategic 
resource allocation decisions concerning their own human capital and that of others. For household 
income, an additional argument concerns the effect of IPR protection on power relationships between 
innovators and complementary asset holders. 
Education influences two distinct forms of ‘human intellectual capital’ (Moen, 2005:84). The 
basic form of human intellectual capital is expressed in the form of cognitive and intellectual ability 
and skills carried by individuals. Such human capital is often characterized by “natural excludability 
and appropriability” (Zucker et al., 2002), by virtue of its being embedded in individuals, as well as its 
inalienability from these. Another form of human capital is expressed in the form of its products – i.e., 
the intellectual property produced by individuals. To the extent that it can be codified and protected, 
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duality gives rise to different moderating effects of intellectual property on the education – growth 
aspiration and household income – growth aspiration relationship, respectively. 
In order to grow their ventures, entrepreneurs seek to exploit various forms of human 
intellectual capital, mostly their own (Hellmann, 2007b; Moen, 2005) or that of others. To the extent 
that human intellectual capital is embedded in individuals, it may operate as a source of monopoly rent 
because the knowledge is not publicly available or easily copied. Thus, human intellectual ability and 
skills enhanced by education may be less sensitive to deficiencies in intellectual property protection 
regimes than more codified forms of human capital. Well-educated individuals should be able to guard 
against misappropriation of their embedded human capital even when the IPR protection regime is 
weak, and thus, grow their ventures even in the presence of weak IPR protection. One the other hand, 
as argued above, the opportunity costs associated with the allocation of one’s valuable skills and 
intellectual ability would guarantee that educated individuals would be more likely to seek to grow 
their ventures even under conditions of weak IPR protection.  
Another important aspect of human intellectual capital is made up by the intellectual property 
produced by high-human capital individuals. Here, the effect of IPR regime on the education – growth 
aspiration relationship should operate differently. When the IPR protection regime is weak, well-
educated individuals may not have other choices than to rely on their embedded human capital and 
leverage its inalienability to protect their intellectual property when seeking to grow their ventures. On 
the other hand, when the IPR protection regime is strong, intellectual property can be protected and 
traded in markets for technology, thereby offering an alternative route for well-educated individuals to 
benefit from their intellectual property. 
Summarizing, when intellectual property is weakly protected in a given country, the options 
available for high-human capital individuals to exploit their human intellectual capital are reduced due 
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innovators cannot rely on the market for technology and need to exploit their own human intellectual 
capital by starting their own growth firms. On the other hand, if the IPR protection regime is strong, 
highly educated individuals can also use the market to exploit their human intellectual capital and its 
fruits, in addition to starting their own growth ventures. Because of this effect, the relationship between 
education and growth aspiration will grow weaker in strong IPR protection regimes, not because 
educated individuals will be dis-incentivized to grow their ventures, but because they will have more 
alternatives for taking advantage of their human intellectual capital.  
H3  The strength of IPR protection regime will moderate negatively the relationship between an 
individual’s education and her growth aspirations such that at under weak IPR protection, the 
relationship between education and entrepreneurial growth aspiration will be stronger. 
 
The same technical appropriability considerations suggest different moderating influences for 
the relationship between household income and entrepreneurial growth aspirations. This is because of 
the way national IPR protection regimes facilitate the functioning of markets for technology (Shane, 
2002). When the markets of technology operate well (i.e., when the intellectual property protection 
regime is strong), high-income individuals can use their financial resources to use the market for 
technology to buy the intellectual inputs required by their ventures. In addition to exploiting their own 
human capital, high-income individuals can use their financial resources to exploit the intellectual 
property produced by others. Under conditions of weak IPR protection, the possibilities of high-income 
individuals for doing so are diminished, because the markets for technology will not work properly. 
Thus, individuals form high-income households will be better able to leverage their financial resources 
for the pursuit of growth opportunities in countries where the IPR protection regime is strong.  
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resources. To implement their business model, entrepreneurial firms often need to rely on 
complementary assets (Teece, 1998). The need to access and draw on complementary business assets 
creates a dependency relationship, which may expose the firm to potential opportunism by either 
external resource holders or third parties (Casciaro et al., 2005; Teece, 1986). This places new firms at 
a disadvantage relative to incumbents, who have had more time to accumulate resources and establish 
themselves as fully functional business concerns. If the entrepreneurial firm’s intellectual property is 
well protected, it may overcome this disadvantage either by developing the necessary complementary 
assets by itself, or by negotiating advantageous terms with external resource holders (Casciaro et al., 
2005; Shane, 2001; Teece, 1998). However, under conditions of weak IPR protection, the attractiveness 
to start new ventures is reduced, because there is a greater danger that returns to invention may leak to 
complementary asset holders (Foss et al., 2008; Schendel et al., 2007). In such situations, individuals 
from high-income households would be less incentivized to invest their financial resources for the 
pursuit of entrepreneurial opportunities. 
Summarizing, IPR protection should have a positive moderating influence on the relationship 
betweenhousehold income and growth aspiration, because of how a functioning market for technology 
has different effects on individuals seeking to exploit their own human capital, on the one hand, and on 
individuals seeking to exploit the intellectual capital produced by others, on the other. We therefore 
hypothesize: 
H4  The strength of IPR protection regime will moderate positively the relationship between an 
individual’s household income and her growth aspirations such that under strong IPR 
protection, the relationship between household income and entrepreneurial growth aspiration 
will be stronger. 
Jena Economic Research Papers 2009 - 080  We should note that the above arguments do not explicitly distinguish between selection effects 
and behavioral effects. In the case of strong intellectual property protection, our arguments regarding a 
negative moderation influence on the education – growth aspiration relationship imply a selection 
effect: well-functioning markets for technology mean that educated individuals have more alternative 
ways to benefit from their human intellectual capital. On the other hand, when the IPR protection 
regime is weak, educated individuals are pushed to pursue their own entrepreneurial ventures, 
suggesting a behavioral effect. For the positive moderating relationship between household income and 
growth aspiration, both behavioral and selection effects are similarly implied. When IPR protection is 
weak, individuals from high-income households have little incentive to invest significant financial 
resources to new ventures, suggesting a selection effect. When the IPR protection is strong, our 
arguments suggest a combined selection and behavioral effect: ex ante, there are more opportunities 
available, an ex post, wealthy entrepreneurs would have greater confidence to invest in building their 
business. Thus, distinguishing between selection and behavioral effects is tricky, both theoretically and 
in practice. In the empirical analysis, we control for the self-selection of individuals into 




VARIABLES AND METHOD 
To test the above hypotheses, we combined nine years of adult-population survey data from the Global 
Entrepreneurship Monitor GEM survey to form an initial database of over 902 000 interviews with 
adult-age individuals from 16 to 64 years old. This data provided our base sample, as shown in Table 1. 
The Global Entrepreneurship Monitor carries out annual interviews of at least 2 000 adult-age 
individuals in each of its participating countries, collecting data on the entrepreneurial activities and 
                                                       
1   This is not a strict test of the selection vs behavioural effect, however. A strict test of this effect would be to follow 
individuals over time, introducing variance in external IPR conditions. To our knowledge, such datasets are not 
currently available. 
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2
  Since its inception in 1998, the GEM adult population survey dataset has expanded to cover 
more than 50 countries by 2008 (Minniti et al., 2006; Reynolds et al., 2005). The adult-population 
surveys are carried out once per year for each participating country, and at least 2 000 random 
interviews are carried out annually in each of the participating countries. All data are weighted based 
on relevant demographic variables so as to ensure that the data is as fully representative of a given 
country’s adult-age population as possible
. We used the GEM dataset as our source 
of individual-level data on entrepreneurial growth aspirations and its individual-level predictors. This 
individual-level data was complemented with country-level data on IPR protection taken from the 
Index of Economic Freedom (IEF) dataset. 
3
In addition to its widespread use by economic policy-makers, the quality of GEM data is also 
widely recognized by both economists and management researchers (e.g., Ardagna et al., 2008; Bowen 
et al., 2008; Dreher et al., 2007; Uhlaner et al., 2007)
.  
4
                                                       
2   For a full explanation of the content and procedures of the GEM study, please refer to Reynolds et al (2005). 
. High quality data is ensured by strictly 
harmonized and closely supervised data collection across the participating countries. In each 
participating country, a team of respected entrepreneurship academics from a well-established national 
university supervises the data collection. The data is collected annually by national survey vendors 
under the supervision of national teams, with core measures unchanged since 1998. Over 70% of all 
country-year samples of adult population survey data have been collected by means of telephone 
surveys, using stratified random sampling and multiple weighting procedures. In some countries, where 
telephone surveys are not feasible, face-to-face interviews have been carried out using multi-stage 
randomized cluster sampling designs
4. Average response rates to the adult-population surveys are over 
3 Basic weights for each country include gender and age. Depending on country, additional weights can be used, such as 
ethnic or religious affiliation as well as region of domicile. 
4 See www.gemconsortium.org for recent academic biography of GEM. 
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5
  GEM identifies three types of entrepreneurs with a battery of up to four filter questions. Nascent 
entrepreneurs are individuals who are in the process of trying to start a firm. New (or early-stage) 
entrepreneurs are owner-managers of entrepreneurial firms which have been in existence for less than 
42 months. Established entrepreneurs are owner-managers of entrepreneurial firms which have been in 
existence for longer than 42 months. Because our analysis focused on the strategic decision to allocate 
one’s human and financial resources in the presence of trade-offs, we chose to limit our analysis to 
nascent and new entrepreneurs only. Established entrepreneurs have already established themselves in 
their entrepreneurial career paths and are thus not likely to face acute career trade-offs. The career 
trade-offs faced by nascent and new entrepeneurs will be very real, because the majority of them still 
have a full-time job (Autio, 2007). In total, the GEM 2000 – 2008 dataset contained 37 382 nascent and 
new entrepreneurs, for whom complete data was available. 
. Confidence in GEM data’s 
high quality is further strengthened by independent validation tests, including the following: a 
comparison by Reynolds et al. (2005) of GEM’s estimates of firm birth rates against US New Firm 
Census and Eurostat data; Acs, Desai and Klapper’s (2009) comparison of GEM’s indices of nascent 
and new entrepreneurship against the World Bank’s Entrepreneurship Survey dataset; and Ardagna and 
Lusardi’s (2008) comparison of GEM data against the Flash Eurobarometer Surveys from 2002 to 
2004.  
Variables 
  The dependent variable (GROASP) in our study measures entrepreneurial growth aspirations of 
identified nascent and new entrepreneurs. Each individual was asked to estimate their expected number 
of employees within 5 years’ time. Because our theory centers on trade-offs and opportunity costs 
associated with initial allocations of human and financial capital to new ventures, we argue that growth 
                                                       
5 Based on GEM data quality analysis carried out by Jeff Seaman of Babson College, presented January 18, 2008. 
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resource allocations by individuals, as well as on the conditions in which those initial resource 
allocations are committed. Such commitments are influenced by rational expectations regarding the 
entrepreneurial opportunity, formed through considerations of the likelihood of success. Growth 
aspiration thus reflects a ‘best guess’, under uncertainty, regarding both expected and required success 
of the new ventures, as influenced by both individual and contextual factors. Although our measure 
does not reflect actual growth, and most guesses are likely to be optimistic, our measure nevertheless 
provides a good reflection of considerations driving strategic resource allocations to entrepreneurship. 
The weighted average of GROASP was 11.18 expected jobs. Because the distribution was 
biased, a natural logarithm of expected jobs was used after removing and re-setting extreme cases
6
  The predictor variables in our analysis were education (EDU: primary, secondary, post-
secondary, and graduate experience), household income (HHINC: three tiers in national distribution – 
lowest, middle and highest third), and IPR protection (IPR – from the Index of Economic Freedom 
data). IEF’s IPR protection index combines various aspects of the degree to which private property is 
protected in a given country, intellectual property rights respected, and citizens protected against 
extralegal seizure of property. 
. To 
minimize the effect of idiosyncratic variation in individual contexts on our dependent variable (e.g., in 
terms of resource access), we controlled for the number of current jobs held by the ventures. 
  As control variables in our analysis we used the age of the individual (AGE); mean-centred and 
squared term of age (AGE_SQ); and gender (SEX). In the GEM data, age and gender are statistically 
significantly associated with high-growth aspirations, with younger individuals and men typically 
indicating higher growth aspirations than older individuals and women (Autio, 2007). In addition, when 
                                                       
6 The data was examined closely for any outliers or inconsistencies. All entrepreneurs expecting 0 jobs in five years were 
removed from the analysis. The removal of these, as well as the extreme cases, did not affect the results reported here. 
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Furthermore, we controlled for fear of failure (FEARFAIL), measured with the statement: “Fear of 
failure would prevent me from starting a new business”.  This statement measures an individual’s lack 
of confidence in her ability to cope with endogenous or exogenous uncertainty associated with new 
business ventures, as well as the fear of anticipated consequences of such failure, thus providing an 
inverse proxy of self-efficacy. 
  We also used country-level control variables. A country’s level of economic development has 
been shown to be associated with the nature of entrepreneurial activity within the country (Bosma et 
al., 2009; Levie et al., 2008). We therefore controlled for the country’s GDP per capita (ppp), as well 
as the mean-centred squared term of it so as to capture any curvilinear effects. 
An individual’s entrepreneurial growth aspiration (GROASP) can be observed only for those 
individuals who first self-select into entrepreneurship. The distribution of GROASP is therefore left-
truncated, and individuals’ growth aspiration can be influenced by some of the same factors that also 
influence the self-selection of individuals into entrepreneurship, causing biased estimates if not 
controlled (Heckman, 1979). We therefore performed the analysis in two stages . In the first stage, we 
performed a selection equation that sought to predict the self-selection of individuals into 
entrepreneurship. This selection equation was performed as panel probit equation (Kyriazidou, 1997; 
Wooldridge, 1995). Consistent with recommended practice, in addition to variables in the eventual 
regression equation, we also used additional instruments to predict an individual’s status as an early-
stage entrepreneur in the GEM data. The omission of instruments might cause inverse Mill’s 
distribution to be flat, thereby reducing its efficacy as a selection control. The residuals from this 
equation were then used to compute an inverse Mill’s ratio (INVMILLS), which was included as a 
control in the eventual regression equation predicting an individual’s growth aspiration. 
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contains data on whether or not a given individual personally knows other people who have started new 
firms (1=yes). Such vicarious exposure has been shown to influence the predilection of individuals to 
become entrepreneurs themselves. As an additional instrument, we used the individual’s perception of 
skills required to start a new company (1=yes). This question addressed specifically the act of starting a 
new company and not on the growth of the company. 
 
Method 
As explained above, we controlled for the self-selection of individuals into entrepreneurship. 
Our dataset was cross-sectional panel data, grouped by country and year, and combining observations 
at the individual level. We thus had hierarchical and clustered data, in which the assumption of 
independence of observations is violated. This increases the possibility of ‘false positives’ in ordinary 
OLS analysis due to under-estimation of standard errors because of their non-normal distribution 
(Hofmann et al., 2000). For this reason, we applied hierarchical linear modelling, using a generalized 
least squares (GLS) procedure to estimate fixed parameters and maximum-likelihood estimates of 
variance components (Raudenbush, 1988) with an unstructured covariance specification (Kozlowski et 
al., 2000; Rabe-Hesketh et al., 2005). Random-effects multi-level analysis allows regression 
coefficients and intercepts to vary across countries, and it also makes it possible to test cross-level 
moderation effects (Martin et al., 2007). The GLS approach allows the standard errors to vary across 
groups and provides a weighted level-2 regression so that groups with more reliable level-1 estimates 
are given greater weights and therefore exercise greater influence in the level-2 regression (Hofmann et 
al., 2000: 478). This results in more accurate estimates of cross-level effects. In our data, we had both 
individual-level predictors of entrepreneurial growth aspirations (AGE, AGE_SQ, SEX, FEARFAIL, 
NOWJOB, EDU, HHINC), as well as country-level controls and direct and moderation effects 
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where variables are as above and γ00 = intercept, γn0 = main effect coefficients of individual-level 
predictors, γ01 = main effect coefficient of country-level predictor (IPR), γ02 and γ03 = main effect 
coefficients of country-level controls,  γn0 = main effect coefficients of individual-level controls, and γn1 
= main effect coefficients of cross-level interaction terms. The combination (U0j + U1jxij + Rij) 
represents the random part of the equation, where U0j and U1j are country-level residuals, Rij represents 
individual-level residuals, and xij represent individual-level direct effects. As we are interested in 
grand-level interactions rather than between-group interactions, the interaction terms ( IPR*EDU and 
IPR*HHINC) were formed using grand mean centred variables to test the moderation effects 
(Hofmann, 1997; Hofmann et al., 1998).  
Because the software and techniques to conduct multi-level analyses are still evolving, we used 
two different approaches, using different software packages, to conduct the analysis. The results 
reported in tables 3-4 were computed using Stata’s (v. 9.0) xtmixed command, with robust standard 
error specification, maximum-likelihood estimation, the EM estimation algorithm, and year-country 
clustering to account for time effects. We then replicated the analysis using the HLM (v. 6.0.6) 
software package for hierarchical linear and nonlinear modeling (Raudenbush et al., 2008), as well as 
the R package. The different approaches produced effectively identical results. 
Jena Economic Research Papers 2009 - 080Our objective was to examine the existence and magnitude of possible cross-level moderating 
effects between national appropriability conditions (IPR), individual-level predictors, and an 
individual-level dependent variable. This objective implied a four-step testing strategy, given the multi-
level character of our data (Hofmann et al., 2000). First, we estimated the amount of between-group 
variance in the data. The absence of between-group variance would mean that there are no meaningful 
differences between groups in the data, suggesting absence of any institutional effects on the dependent 
variable. Second, we tested a random-coefficient regression model to determine whether significant 
variance resided in intercepts and slopes across year-country groups. This was a significant 
precondition for testing hypotheses 3-4. Third, we tested an intercepts-as-outcomes model to see if 
country-level appropriability conditions were statistically significantly associated with the dependent 
variable
7
RESULTS AND IMPLICATIONS 
. This step provided an ‘acid test’ of the general importance of IPR, and it also allowed us to 
check whether significant variance remained in the data to justify the inspection of cross-level 
interaction terms. Fourth, we tested a slopes-as-outcomes model as a direct test of cross-level 
moderation effects. As the final, confirmatory step of our analysis, we performed a median-split 
analysis by splitting the data into low-IPR and high-IPR country groups, on the basis of their index 
values of national-level IPR protection. We then checked whether the slope coefficients for the direct 
effects of household income (HHINC) and education (EDUC) on growth aspiration (GROASP) 
differed significantly among low-IPR and high-IPR countries, as suggested by the cross-level 
interaction terms. 
Table 1 shows sample descriptives, and table 2 shows the correlation matrix. A precondition for 
running a hierarchical linear model is that significant between-group variance exists for the dependent 
                                                       
7   Although we did not directly hypothesize for a direct effect of national-level appropriability conditions on 
individual-level growth aspirations, an intercepts-as-outcomes model was used as an ’acid test’ to determine, 
whether it was meaningful to proceed to a more detailed analysis of cross-level moderation effects. 
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ANOVA with individual-level growth aspiration (GROASP) as the dependent variable and country 
group membership as the predictor. The model included no predictor variables, as our interest was 
purely on checking the existence of between-groups variance. Consequently, the model tested was of 
the form (Hofmann et al., 2000: 479):  
Level 1:  ij j r GROASP + = 0 β  
                    (2) 
Level 2:  j j U0 00 0 + = γ β , 
where β0j = mean of GROASP for group j; γ00 = grand mean of GROASP, and variance in (rij) = σ
2 = 
within-group variance in GROASP, and variance in (Uoj) = τ00 = between-group variance in GROASP. 
In HLM, this test indicated significant between-groups variance within the data, with χ
2(147) = 2 
223.80 (p<0,000). The test was thus strongly supportive of the existence of between-groups variance in 
the data, thereby supporting the use of a hierarchical linear model to perform the hypothesis tests. The 
intra-class correlation (ICC), calculated as τ00 /(τ00 + σ
2), was 0.0969, indicating that 9.7% of the total 
variance within the data resided between groups (95% confidence interval: 8.1% - 11.3%). This is 
within the normal range that can be expected of grouped data of this nature. For example, Bliese  
(2000: 361) indicated that one should expect ICC values to range between 5% and 20% in grouped 
empirical data. The size if ICC suggests that individual-level growth aspirations tend to be dominated 
by individual-level factors rather than country-level factors
8
                                                       
8   Note that there are other group-level factors, such as social peer effects, that might explain greater portions of 
  variance than country-level institutions. 
. This, as such, is consistent with the 
emphasis of received entrepreneurship research, which has emphasized individual-level influences on 
entrepreneurial behaviors. Nevertheless, the country-level variance was both non-trivial and highly 
significant, thereby allowing us to move to the next phase of our analysis. 
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predictors. The GLS model (random effects, robust standard errors) was estimated to check the 
significance of level-1 slopes (direct 1-level effects on GROASP), as well as to determine, whether 
significant enough variance existed in level-1 intercepts and slopes to test cross-level effects. The 
equations tested were as follows: 
Level 1: 
ij j j j j j j r SEX SQ AGE AGE EDUC HHINC GROASP + + + + + + = ) ( ) _ ( ) ( ) ( ) ( 5 4 3 2 1 0 β β β β β β  
                        (3) 

















where  00 γ = mean of the intercepts across groups;  10 γ  and  20 γ  = means of the slopes across groups for 
household income (HHINC) and education (EDUC), respectively, and U0j – U2j are country-level 
residuals
9
As the next step, we tested an intercepts-as-outcomes model to check whether country-level 
conditions were statistically significantly associated with individual-level growth aspirations. Although 
not directly hypothesized, this test provided a precondition for the testing of moderation effects. In 
practice, this involved using the same level-1 specification as in the random coefficient model above, 
. The HLM analysis showed that there was significant variance in intercepts across year-
country groups (τ00 = 0.054; χ
2(8) = 2 745.54 (p<0.000)). Also, the LR test indicated that the random-
coefficients specification provided a significantly better fit than fixed-coefficients specification (χ
2 = 
2222.83 (p<0.000)), indicating highly significant between-groups variance in slopes. Combined, these 
observations strongly supported the preconditions for hypotheses 3-4 (Hofmann et al., 2000). 
                                                       
9   As such,  10 γ  and  20 γ  provide direct tests of H1 and H2, but we report only full equations with cross-level  
variables so as to save space. Both coefficients were positive and highly significant, as also reported in Tables 3-4. 
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testing the direct cross-level effect of HHINC and EDUC. The intellectual property protection index 
(IPR) was a statistically significant predictor of the level-1intercept terms ( 01 γ  = -0.0056; z = -5.94; 
p=0.000). National-level IPR protection was negatively associated with higher country-level mean of 
individual-level growth aspirations, perhaps suggesting a specialization effect under which small firms 
specialize in innovation, and successful ones are acquired by incumbents rather than growing 
organically. Also, the chi-square tests associated with the residual variance in the intercept across 
groups indicated that there remained significant variance in the data to be explained by additional level-
2 variables, allowing us to proceed to testing the cross-level moderation hypotheses 3-4 (τ00 = 0.0514, 
χ
2(9) = 2786.66, p<0.000). 
As the final step of our analysis, and as the test of hypotheses 3-4, we tested a slopes-as-outcomes 
model, as specified in equation (1) above. This test is shown in Table 3. As expected, the moderation 
effect of IPR protection on education is negative and statistically highly significant (p< 0.000; 1-tailed 
significance), indicating that when the intellectual property protection is stronger, education indeed is a 
weaker predictor of entrepreneurial growth aspirations. When IPR protection regime is weak, the effect 
of education on entrepreneurial growth aspiration is strengthened. H3 therefore receives support in our 
data. We can also observe a positive, statistically significant moderation effect of IPR on the household 
income – growth aspiration relationship (p<0.05). When the IPR protection regime is strong, household 
income is a stronger predictor of entrepreneurial growth aspirations. H4 is therefore supported in our 
data. Note, however, that the direct effect of both education and household income on growth 
aspirations is stronger than the moderation effects.  
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in Table 3, suggesting that unobserved variables have indeed influenced the self-selection of 
individuals into entrepreneurship, and that the effect of unobservables on GROASP is positive. 
  As a final, confirmatory step of our analysis, we performed a median split within the clustered 
sample and performed the regressions separately for ‘high- IPR‘ and ‘low- IPR‘ countries. These tests 
are shown in Table 4. Consistent with the interaction effect, the GLS regression coefficient for the 
education variable decreased from the value of 0.175 in weak-IPR countries to 0.052 in strong-IPR 
countries. Thus, the effect of education on growth aspiration grew weaker as a function of the strength 
of a country’s IPR protection regime, but it remained positive and statistically significant throughout. 
Also, the effect of household income on growth aspiration increase from the value of 0.208 in weak-
IPR countries to 0.253 in strong-IPR countries. These patterns confirm the results of the cross-level 
moderation analysis shown in Table 3. As such, the moderating effect appears particularly strong for 
education, as the value of the average GLS coefficient more than tripled when moving from strong-IPR 
to weak-IPR countries, indicating that education was three times as strong a predictor of growth 
aspirations in weak-IPR countries as it was in strong-IPR ones. For household income, the effect of 
national-level IPR protection regime was much smaller, as the difference in mean slopes was only 
22%. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
In spite of the well-established recognition of the multi-level character and consequent context 
dependency of entrepreneurial behaviour (Aldrich et al., 1994; Low et al., 1988) and in spite of 
repeated calls, multi-level analyses of entrepreneurial behaviour remain rare (Busenitz et al., 2003; 
Davidsson et al., 2001; Phan, 2004). This is deplorable, given the potential of multi-level theoretical 
and empirical designs to provide for a more robust and generalized understanding of why and under 
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1999). As Phan (2004: 620) observed: “One cannot fully understand, for example, opportunity 
recognition as an emergence phenomenon, without being sensitive to its higher contexts – culture, 
institutional arrangements, and political-economic exigencies.” Study designs limited to a single level 
only imply often unreasonable assumptions regarding, in particular, the homogeneity of individual-
level behaviors, as well as the independence of entrepreneurial decisions from the higher-level contexts 
in which those decisions are made (Klein et al., 1994). This may give rise to erroneous empirical 
inferences, especially in situations where higher-order contingencies moderate the effect of individual-
level characteristics on individual-level behaviors (House et al., 1995; Klein et al., 2000). 
In this study we applied a multi-level research design to address the question: Why do some 
individuals choose to seek growth with their entrepreneurial ventures, while others do not? In spite of 
extensive evidence pointing to the importance of high-growth firms for economic development (Acs, 
2008; Henrekson et al., 2008), the literature is virtually silent about the determinants of entrepreneurial 
growth aspirations in young firms. This is an important gap, given the multitude of studies that point to 
the important role of entrepreneurial entry for job creation
10
                                                       
10 For a survey of the literature see Magnus Henrekson  (2008). 
. Depending on the phase of the economic 
cycle, new firms may be responsible for anything from one third to up to the totality of net job creation 
in different economies, with growth-oriented entrepreneurs generating up to 75-80% of this impact 
(Henrekson et al., 2008). The study of entrepreneurial growth aspirations is therefore important. In this 
study, we have sought to shed light on this phenomenon, focusing specifically on how environmental 
and institutional contingencies moderate the propensity of individuals to pursue entrepreneurial growth. 
By so doing, our study responds to the numerous calls for multi-level approaches to the study of 
entrepreneurship in general and for the study of the effect of IPR regimes on strategic entrepreneurship 
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entrepreneurial behaviors (Busenitz et al., 2003; Phan, 2004; Schendel et al., 2007).  
  In this study we tested whether national-level appropriability conditions have an influence on 
how different individuals choose to exploit their human and financial capital for the pursuit of 
entrepreneurial growth. In building the theoretical model, we mixed individual-level explanations of 
entrepreneurial behaviors with macro-level insights on how national-level appropriability conditions 
regulate economic activity. Although human and financial capital are central influences on 
entrepreneurial outcomes, and technical appropriability conditions exercise an important influence on 
entrepreneurial choice, the interactions between these two sets of variables have not been examined in 
prior research. Our findings add new, counterintuitive insight into the phenomenon studied. Contrary to 
claims that poor IPR protection will reduce efforts to take advantage of human intellectual capital, we 
found the opposite to be true: education was found to be a stronger predictor of growth orientation in 
countries with weak IPR regimes, because the absence of IPR protections weakens the possibilities of 
well-educated individuals to profit from their human intellectual capital through the market 
mechanism. When the IPR protection regime is weak, well-educated individuals may have to exploit 
their intellectual assets by setting up their own growth firms. On the other hand, under conditions of 
strong IPR protection, individuals from high-income households were more likely to want to grow their 
firms, because they can rely on the market for intellectual capital to supply them with the intellectual 
assets required to sustain new firm growth. This observation is consistent with agency-theoretic 
considerations of the effectiveness of patent protection and spin-off decisions (Shane, 2001). Although 
only some 9% of the total variance resided between groups, thus being attributable to institutional 
factors, the effect at the individual level was significant, as the effect of education on individual-level 
growth aspiration was twice as strong in low-IPR contexts as it was in high-IPR contexts. Strong 
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aspirations.  
While this is one of the first studies to demonstrate the effect of national-level moderators on 
individual-level growth aspirations, country-level moderation effects were weaker than the direct effect 
of individual-level direct predictors of entrepreneurial growth aspirations. Age, gender, fear of failure, 
education, and household income each exhibited strong, direct influences on growth aspirations, 
stronger than any moderation influences. This pattern shows that, although contextual influences 
cannot be ignored, the individual remains the central agent in entrepreneurial endeavors. This, as such, 
is consistent with the emphasis of the entrepreneurship research tradition. Of individual-level 
characteristics, household income and gender exhibited clearly the strongest influences on 
entrepreneurial growth aspirations. The direct effect of education, while highly significant, was slightly 
less strong. 
The significant influence of household income on growth aspirations may indicate that 
entrepreneurial growth opportunities may be, to some extent, socially stratified. Household income is 
an important determinant of one’s social class. High-income households may have better social 
connections, and they therefore may get to see better growth opportunities. Another possible 
mechanism may concern resource acquisition. It may be that high-income households are simply better 
able to act on the opportunities that they see, by mobilizing their household wealth for the pursuit of 
entrepreneurial growth. A high household income may also create an expectation for a certain lifestyle, 
the pursuit of which could then be reflected on entrepreneurial growth aspirations. 
Even though individual-level predictors are important, intellectual property protection does 
moderate the effect of household income and education on growth aspirations beyond the direct effect 
of these. As such, this finding highlights the influence that institutional conditions may exercise on 
strategic entrepreneurial behaviors. Thus far, entrepreneurship theory has been mostly preoccupied 
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‘means’ and ‘ends’ in socioeconomic systems (Companys et al., 2007; Kirzner, 1997; Peter, 2008; 
Shane et al., 2000). Our study shows that individuals may not react similarly to opportunities in all 
contexts, but rather, their reactions may be conditioned by the institutional context within which the 
individuals find themselves. Thus, our findings support the need, highlighted by Hitt et al (2007), for 
multilevel research designs to address the complexities on context-dependent individual and 
organizational behaviors. In addition to providing a way to re-introduce context into the study of 
important phenomena, multi-level designs also provide a mechanism for cross-pollination among 
specialized subfields addressing different levels of research in the field of management (Hitt et al., 
2007). We suggest that future research on strategic entrepreneurial behaviors could be well advised to 
pay greater attention to the context within which those behaviors are observed.  
Our findings also have implications for policy. From a policy perspective, the story emerging 
from our analysis is one of the effect of IPR protection on specialization. A strong IPR protection 
regime offers well-educated individuals more choice when they seek to exploit their human intellectual 
capital. The negative moderation of IPR on the effect of education does not signal that IPR protection 
would somehow make well-educated entrepreneurs less motivated to grow their firms. Instead, a strong 
IPR protection regime allows well-educated individuals to specialize on the production of human 
intellectual capital and use the markets for technology as one additional mechanism for its exploitation. 
Similarly, functioning markets for technology may enable some high-income individuals to focus on 
exploitation of human intellectual capital rather than its production. Both of these findings can thus be 
read as beneficial effects of strong IPR protection. 
This study has a number of limitations. Our measure of growth aspiration was based on 
expected employment within five years. While better suited for the study of factors driving initial 
resource allocations into strategic entrepreneurship, most aspirations are likely to turn out optimistic. 
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they are not a sufficient condition. However, in our theoretical framework, data on eventual growth is 
not even necessary, as our interest is on factors that trigger resource allocations into strategic 
entrepreneurship. Second, we tested the effect of only one country-level moderating effect on strategic 
entrepreneurial behaviors, the strength of the national IPR regime. While IPR protection has been 
recognized as a central influence on strategic entrepreneurship, also other country-level influences 
exist, such as the national governance regime (e.g., rule of law, predictability of regulations, regulations 
imposed upon firms), national culture, and national fiscal regime. Third, our theoretical framework has 
emphasized the rational aspects of the decision to allocate resources into strategic entrepreneurship. 
While we think that this is a justified decision, given our focus on how IPR impacts the distribution of 
profits among different stakeholders, it is well known that entrepreneurs are also motivated by many 
other forces that have less to do with economic rationality. Finally, our theoretical framework has 
evoked both selection effects and behavioral effects for the cross-level moderation influence of IPR 
protection on the education (household income) – growth aspiration relationship. The dataset available 
for our analysis was cross-sectional panel data, which prevented us from providing a strict test between 
the two effects. Our control of the self-selection of individuals provided only a partial answer to this 
dilemma. More research is needed to more clearly distinguish between the two effects. 
Summarizing, our study has demonstrated that national conditions can have a significant effect 
on strategic entrepreneurial behaviors. We hope that our initial foray into this area will inspire further 
investigations into individual- and country-level determinants of strategic entrepreneurship. 
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Entrepreneurial   
Growth Aspiration 
IPR Protection 
Individual Level Effects 















Angola 1 491 23.9% Jordan 1 989 19.2%
Argentina 15 578 13.6% Kazakhstan 2 000 9.2%
Australia 10 230 10.2% Latvia 7 933 5.5%
Austria 4 191 4.2% Macedonia 1 746 13.5%
Belgium 22 352 3.3% Malaysia 2 005 11.5%
Bolivia 1 879 30.0% Mexico 9 118 11.7%
Bosnia & Herzegovina 1 586 8.8% Netherlands 20 197 5.1%
Brazil 19 837 13.3% New Zealand 7 572 14.8%
Canada 6 660 8.3% Norway 14 175 7.8%
Chile 15 315 13.0% Peru 7 560 33.0%
China (PR) 10 835 14.3% Philippines 2 000 21.3%
Colombia 6 082 22.4% Poland 5 396 7.3%
Croatia 12 778 7.7% Portugal 4 981 7.0%
Czech Republic 1 628 7.4% Puerto Rico 1 830 2.7%
Denmark 24 934 5.5% Romania 3 406 3.3%
Dominican Republic 4 094 17.5% Russia 7 288 3.2%
Ecuador 5 860 22.7% Serbia 3 580 7.2%
Egypt 2 603 13.3% Singapore 19 212 5.6%
Finland 24 538 5.1% Slovenia 17 116 4.5%
France 14 089 4.1% South Africa 21 298 6.7%
Germany 44 865 6.0% South Korea 7 530 13.4%
Greece 11 970 7.0% Spain 134 888 6.4%
Hong Kong 6 599 4.8% Sweden 36 805 3.6%
Hungary 15 701 5.9% Switzerland 11 040 6.1%
Iceland 13 417 11.2% Taiwan 1 977 4.4%
India 12 368 12.1% Thailand 6 985 17.2%
Indonesia 1 998 19.3% Turkey 7 217 5.4%
Iran 3 119 9.2% Uganda 2 957 29.7%
Ireland 15 327 7.4% UAE 2 857 6.9%
Israel 10 875 5.9% United Kingdom 113 604 5.2%
Italy 17 726 4.7% Uruguay 4 897 11.5%
Jamaica 7 992 18.5% USA 27 168 10.8%
Japan 15 689 2.8%
Total 902 533 7.8%  
 
Jena Economic Research Papers 2009 - 080Table 2   Correlation matrix (grand correlations) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 Age
2 Age_sq 0.0308
3 Sex 0.026 -0.026
4 Education level -0.0789 -0.1018 -0.0124
5 Household income -0.0243 -0.0981 -0.087 0.2353
6 Fear of failure -0.0028 -0.0353 0.0664 -0.0428 -0.0544
7 GDP per capita 0.0845 -0.0082 0.0084 0.1531 -0.0076 0.0156
8 GDP per cap squared -0.0133 0.0019 0.007 0.0078 -0.0012 -0.019 0.396
9 IPR protection index 0.1057 -0.0177 0.0161 0.1215 0.0149 -0.0016 0.5266 -0.0261  
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Mixed-effects ML regression Number of obs 37,328
Number of groups 270




Log likelihood = -55086.367 Prob > chi2  0.000
Coef. Std. Err. z
inverse Mill's ratio 0.6320 0.1178 5.36 ***
Current jobs 0.0029 0.0001 24.91 ***
Age -0.0104 0.0010 -10.77 ***
Age_sq -0.0004 0.0001 -4.13 ***
Sex -0.4544 0.0305 -14.89 ***
Fear of failure -0.1186 0.0130 -9.09 ***
GDP per capita -2.5E-06 2.3E-06 -1.06
GDP per cap squared 6.1E-11 6.3E-11 0.96
IPR protection index -0.0045 0.0011 -4.16 ***
Education (H1) 0.0839 0.0089 9.48 ***
Household income (H2) 0.2297 0.0143 16.08 ***
IPR*EDUC (H3) -0.0013 0.0004 -3.50 ***
IPR*HHINC (H4) 0.0009 0.0005 1.71 *
cons. 1.1184 0.1789 6.25
LR test vs. linear regression:                                  chi2(6) =  2092.61   Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Note: p < 0.001***; p < 0.01**; p < 0.05*; p < 0.10+
2-tailed significances, hypothesis tests one-tailed
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Mixed-effects ML regression Number of obs 24542
(Strong-IPR countries) Number of groups 172
Obs per group: min 4
avg 142.7
max 1264
Coef. Std. Err. z
inverse Mill's ratio 0.3514 0.1963 1.79 +
Current jobs 0.0036 0.0002 23.82 ***
Age -0.0103 0.0015 -6.82 ***
Age_sq -0.0001 0.0001 -0.65
Sex -0.4009 0.0501 -8.01 ***
Fear of failure -0.1219 0.0170 -7.17 ***
GDP per capita -4.31E-06 2.68E-06 -1.61
GDP per cap squared 1.00E-10 6.95E-11 1.45
Education (H1) 0.0528 0.0119 4.43 ***
Household income (H2) 0.2082 0.0204 10.19 ***
cons. 1.3497 0.2985 4.52
LR test vs. linear regression: chibar2(01) =   690.36 Prob >= chibar2 = 0.0000
Mixed-effects ML regression Number of obs 12786
(Weak-IPR countries) Number of groups 98
Obs per group: min 8
avg 130.5
max 547
Coef. Std. Err. z
inverse Mill's ratio 0.7979 0.1722 4.63 ***
Current jobs 0.0017 0.0002 9.21 ***
Age -0.0085 0.0015 -5.85 ***
Age_sq -0.0005 0.0001 -3.91 ***
Sex -0.4646 0.0441 -10.54 ***
Fear of failure -0.1168 0.0199 -5.87 ***
GDP per capita 4.30E-06 1.29E-05 0.33
GDP per cap squared 3.75E-10 7.01E-10 0.54
Education (H1) 0.1753 0.0122 14.4 ***
Household income (H2) 0.2535 0.0194 13.09 ***
cons. 0.2089 0.4212 0.50
LR test vs. linear regression: chibar2(01) =  1388.56 Prob >= chibar2 = 0.0000
Note: p < 0.001***; p < 0.01**; p < 0.05*; p < 0.10+
2-tailed significances, hypothesis tests one-tailed
GLS regression coefficients  
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